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2Introduction and Overview
Full year 1999 was again a mixed performance year for the high yield bond
market in the United States but for different reasons than the mixed 1998
performance.  Once again, total returns were lackluster, registering just +1.73%.
But, unlike last year’s companion negative return spread vs. U.S. ten-year
Treasuries, the return spread in 1999 was a positive 10.1%, as yield spreads
increased significantly and Treasuries tumbled.  And again, new issuance of high
yield bonds was impressive, topping $100 billion for the third consecutive year, but
aggregate defaults increased dramatically to an all-time record level of over $23
billion (face value).
The default rate registered a sizeable increase, topping 4% (4.15%) for the
first time since 1991 and significantly above the 1.6% level of one year earlier.
Combined with a relatively low recovery rate of below 30 cents on the dollar, the
default loss rate was 3.2% in 1999, compared to a historical arithmetic annual
average of 1.9%.  Despite 1999’s low absolute return, net returns (after deducting
losses from defaults, rating migrations and interest rate changes) for the 1978-1999
period continued to show an attractive compounded return spread over U.S.
Treasury bonds of close to 3.0% per year (2.96%).
This report documents the high yield bond market’s risk and return
performance by presenting traditional and mortality default rate statistics and
providing a matrix of performance statistics over the relevant periods of the
market’s evolution.  Our analysis covers the 1971-1999 period for defaults and the
1978-1999 period for returns.  In addition, we present our annual forecast of
expected defaults for the next three years (2000-2002).  Our 1999 forecast was for
substantially higher defaults than 1998, but we underestimated the record default
levels.  Default levels and rates were swelled in 1999 due to a number of factors,
including the huge new issuance in the 1997-1999 period, a trend toward earlier
defaults, deteriorating credit quality of new issues, pockets of industry fragility, and
the continued vestige of 1998’s flight to quality.
For 2000, we expect default levels to decline to about $17.5 billion and the
default rate to regress to around three percent of the amount outstanding.
3Default Rates
During 1999, a record $23.6 billion of developed country (U.S., Canada, Europe,
Australia) high yield straight bonds defaulted or were exchanged under distressed
conditions.  This amount was comprised of 149 issues from 100 defaulting companies
and resulted in a default rate of 4.15%.  This compares to just 53 issues from 37
companies in 1998.  A list of 1999 defaults appears in Appendix A.1  Th  1999 default
rate is considerably higher than last year's rate (1.60%), above the historic weighted
average annual rate from 1971-1999 of 3.22% per year (2.6% arithmetic average rate),
and is also above the median annual rate (1.60%) over the same 29-year period - (Figures
1 & 2).  The face value of defaults reached record levels, topping the old record from
1991 by almost $5 billion.  Of course, the high yield market is now about three times
larger than it was in 1991.  The default rate calculation is based on a mid-year population
of high yield bonds, estimated to be $567.4 billion.  The default rate in 1999 breaks a six-
year string of rates below 2.0% and was so great that it surprised even those observers,
including the authors, who were expecting a return (or regression) to the mean default
rate of about 3.0% per year.  We will return shortly to a discussion of this sizeable
increase.
                                                 
1 We do not include emerging market defaults in these calculations.  All defaults were U.S., Canada or off-
shore U.S. dollar denominated issues.  While European defaults were not evident, we do expect this area’s
growing population of high yield bonds to “contribute,” starting in 2000 (see D. Newman, T. Crawley and
G. Peters, “Assessing Fair Value of European High Yield: Recovery or Wipeout,” Salomon Smith Barney
(London and New York), January 2000.  In addition, consistent with our past approach, we do not include
those issues that missed interest payments in 1999 but cured their delinquencies within the typical 30-day
grace period or who missed an interest payment in December and still had a grace period remaining into
2000.
4Default Rates and Aging Bias
The 4.15% 1999 default rate is based on a mid-year population estimate of $567.4
billion - an amount that does not include issues that had defaulted prior to 1999 but were
still outstanding.  This population total was swelled again by a continued surge in new
issuance, which increased our base population by over $100 billion from a year earlier
(Figure 1).  Despite the considerably higher population denominator, the default rate
increased dramatically.
When there is a relatively large increase in new issuance in the high yield market,
you normally observe a downward bias in the default rate due to the "aging effect" of
defaults.  This can be clearly seen, at a later point, when we present our mortality
statistics and observe that the marginal default/mortality rates in the first three years after
issuance start out quite low, increase considerably to the third year and then, for the most
part, level off thereafter.  This new issuance aging effect is not possible to observe in the
Moody's (dynamic cohort) or S&P's (static-pool) approaches2  It has been introduced,
however, in recent attempts to build default rate forecasting models (e.g., see Moody’s,
1999).
Our mortality calculations take into account the aging bias, which can manifest
during abnormally high new issuance periods.  Despite all of this, we observe that this
bias, while observable, was not very substantial in 1999, now that the high yield market is
as large as it is.  For example, if the population base had not grown at all from the mid-
year 1998 figure ($465.5), the 1999 default rate would have been 5.06% -- an increase of
                                                 
2 For an in-depth discussion of the various default rate methodologies and results, see J. Caouette, E.
Altman and P. Narayanan, "Managing Credit risk: The Next Great Financial Challenge," John Wiley &
Sons, New York, 1998.
5less than 1% over the actual calculation.  Another reason for the lesser aging bias in 1999
defaults is the unusual observation that over 50% of the defaults in 1999 occurred within
two years of issuance – a point that we will return to.
Quarterly Defaults
In Appendix B, we present default rates on a quarterly basis from 1990-1999.  It
can be observed that the quarterly rates in 1999 were consistently high, with the second
quarter’s level topping $8 billion (more than all of 1998) and 1.5%.  As noted in our
earlier reports, quarterly rates are usually not indicative of trends except possibly back in
the 1990-1991 period when default rates skyrocketed to record levels over several
consecutive quarters.  Yet, in 1999, each quarter’s default rate was greater than 0.8% and
showed a consistently higher level than any quarter since early in 1992 and the years
1990 and 1991.
Our Default Rates vs. Moody’s
There has been considerable discussion in recent years about how the Altman-
NYU Salomon Center default rate calculations differ from those of Moody’s (New York)
results.  Analysts point out that the Moody’s rate, especially in recent years, is
consistently higher.  This can be seen in the last two columns of Appendix B.  These
results represent our 12-month moving average (or to be precise, last-four-quarter)
default rates compared with Moody’s 12-month moving average rate.  One can observe
that Moody’s rate is consistently higher since, essentially, 1992.  The main reason for this
is that they include emerging market corporate and quasi-municipal bond defaults while
we do not. Our calculation essentially has been a domestic default rate calculation.3
                                                 
3 There are other differences in the two calculations, e.g., we do not include cured defaults, but these are
minor compared to the emerging market bias.
6In order to analyze the differences in these two calculations, we constructed a
moving four-quarter Altman/SC rate and compared it to Moody’s 12-month moving
averages, at the relevant quarterly dates.  As noted above, Moody’s rates are, for the most
part, higher.  But, when we ran a correlation of these absolute quarterly rates over the
sample period (36 observations), we find that the correlation is 0.97 and the R-Square
(proportion of one default rate “explained” by the other) is a huge 0.94 (Appendix B).
Even when we ran the regression based on either first differences in the change in the
quarterly default rates or the percentage change in the rates, the correlations were high
(0.77 and 0.57 respectively).  In other words, both measures are depicting very similar
trends and directions of default rates.
Default Losses and Recovery at Default
Default losses also rose substantially in 1999 versus 1998 (3.21% vs. 1.10%) and
were substantially above the average from 1978-1999 of 1.88% per year (2.24% weighted
average annual rate).  Figure 3 shows the 1999 loss rate, which includes the loss of one-
half of the average annual coupon.  Default losses for the last 22 years are shown in
Figure 4.
The average recovery rate on the issues for which we had prices just after default
was 27.9%, the lowest since 1990, far below the venerable 40%-42% historical average
recovery rate (Figures 4 & 5) and considerably lower than last year's figure (35.9%).
This was again somewhat surprising since the majority of 127 defaulting issues with
prices were senior secured (17) or senior unsecured (58), and less than 40% of the issues
were subordinated. Eleven were discounted bonds, where we use accreted values as the
base to determine recovery rates and also in our default total and rate calculations.  The
                                                                                                                                                  
7number of discounted defaulting issues was the highest ever and equal to the number in
1990.
About 70% of all new issuance in the high yield market since 1991 has been
senior in priority.  The much lower than average 1999 recovery rate is a caution to
investors who cannot assume that senior bonds will always result in above average
recovery rates.  For example, the senior unsecured recovery rate in 1999 was only 39.5%
versus an historical average of over 46.5%, and the senior secured average recovery rate
slumped to just 28%, compared to a two-decade average of close to 60%.  Figure 5 lists
the recovery rates (prices just after default) by seniority for 1999 and for the past 22
years.  All of the seniority levels recovered lower amounts in 1999 than the historical
average.  The overall arithmetic average 22-year recovery rate dipped below 40%
(38.8%) and is based on 938 issues (41.9% average, weighted  by the amount outstanding
in each year and a median rate of 41.2%).
In Figure 6, we list the average recovery at default stratified by original bond
rating for the period 1971-1999.  The weighted recoveries for investment grade bonds
definitely show higher rates than for non-investment grade debt, but the three non-
investment grade bond classes continue to show very little differences.  This is also true
after adjusting for seniority bias.
Figure 7 lists the original Standard & Poor's ratings of defaulting issues, as well a
the one year and six-months-prior to default ratings.  Of the 903 issues tabulated, 78.4%
were original issue high yield bonds, and 21.6% were originally rated as investment
grade but eventually defaulted; 7.6% of the defaulted issues were still rated investment
grade one year prior to default and 5.8% six months prior (multiple issues from a few
8large high grade issuers, e.g., Columbia Gas System, however, accounted for a large
proportion of the 12 and six-month-prior investment grade defaults) and most of these
were BBB.
Figure 8 shows that the time it takes for an issue to default compared to its
issuance date makes virtually no difference in the recovery rate.  Most weighted
recoveries by year are in the high $30s to low $40s range.
Deterioration in Original Issuance Credit Quality
One of the apparent reasons for the sizeable increase in defaults in 1999 is the
seeming deterioration in credit quality of new issuance in recent years.  This is
demonstrated by the significant increase in the percentage of bonds that defaulted in the
first and second year after issuance.  From Figure 9, we observe that in 1999, 32 of the
125 issues (for which we had price and original ratings data) defaulted within 12 months
(25.6%), and 69 (55.2%) defaulted within 24 months.  This compares with just 7.7% and
24.3% for the 1971-1999 period (Figure 8) and about 4% and 20% for the 1991-1998
period.4  If we exclude 1999 from the historic database, we observe that the one-year rate
was just 4.9%, and the two-year rate was 20.1% (see our last year’s report, Exhibit 8) for
the background statistics).  Hence, a sizeable increase in one and two year defaults is
observed in the 1999 cohort.  Apparently, this phenomenon is not just for 1999, since a
recent study (Grossman and Verde, FITCH/IBCA, 1999) reached similar conclusions
using data through 1998. Figure 9 shows that higher early defaults have been observed in
some years (e.g., 1989, 1994 and 1997), but the default sample size was quite small in
most years until 1999.
                                                 
4 R. Grossman and M. Verde, “High Yield Industry Default Risk,” December 1999, FITCH/IBCA, New
York.
9We will be watching this phenomenon closely in 2000 to see if this indication of
poorer credit quality persists.  We do observe that the 1998 new issue cohort had 1.86%
(BB) and 3.28% (B) default rates, which are considerably higher than the one-year rates
from 1971-1999 (see our mortality rate data below in Figure 12).  In order to better
understand these statistics, however, we need to analyze the purpose of the financing
(e.g., growth vs. refinancing vs. LBOs), to see if the one or two-year aging results are
symptomatic of credit quality drift or for other reasons.
To pursue this  recent shift in bond default mortality, we gathered data on original
issuance by S&P bond rating over the last decade (1990-1999). From Figure 10, we can
observe the sizeable increase in high yield bond new issuance since 1997—over $100
billion each year -- and the increase in dollar issuance in all three non-investment grade
levels.5  From Figure 11, we also observe that high yield new issuance as a percentage of
all corporate bond issuance increased dramatically in the last three years, accounting for
over 40% of all corporate bond new issuance and as much as 47% in 1999.  And, within
the high yield sector, the percentage of B and CCC rated issues also increased.  In 1999,
B rated bonds comprised 31.2% of all new corporate bond issuance and 66.2% of high
yield issuance.  The CCC cohort was particularly evident in 1998, with $9.3 billion (2.6%
of all issuance and 10% of all high yield issuance).  This was a distinct jump from
previous years. Oddly enough, the 1998 CCC cohort did not contribute to the large
increase in 1999 defaults.  The CCC new issue cohort fell back in 1999 to 1.7% ($3.4
billion), but still was quite high relative to historic norms.
                                                                                                                                                  
5 Note that we only use S&P rated criteria.  If we had also included bonds rated non-investment grade by
Moody’s or other rating agencies, the amounts would be larger.
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The high yield bond industry’s exuberance for new issuance and the apparent
deterioration in credit quality needs to be monitored closely.  No doubt, this deterioration
in credit quality contributed to recent default growth, but the added factor of earlier
defaults exacerbated the 1999 numbers.  Investors will need additional promised yields in
order to expect to achieve return spreads comparable to the last two decades performance
data (see our data at a later point involving return spreads, especially Figure 16).
Other Reasons for the Increase in Defaults
In addition to the deterioration in credit quality and the earlier occurrence of
defaults, three factors contributed to the sizeable increase in 1999.  These are (1) the
increased dollar amount of recent new issuance, (2) the vestige of Russia’s default in
1998, and (3) a number of “sick” industries despite the economy’s overall strength.
We have already documented the huge new issuance years of 1997-1999 and the
expected increase in dollar defaults as these new issues age.  This simple mortality idea is
the basis for our forecasted default numbers and percentages, which we will discuss at a
later point.  If nothing else, a regression to the mean would have caused the 1999 default
amounts and default rate to increase vis-à-vis prior years.
The increase in the default rate to over 4%, however, was caused by additional
factors.  One intangible, but important factor, is the ability of distressed firms to refinance
their indebtedness.  Refinancing occurred with increasing difficulty in the aftermath of
Russia’s default and the flight-to-quality that ensued.  Although this occurrence is mainly
anecdotal, we are convinced that without the Russian contagion, the default rate would
have been lower.
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Industry Defaults
We continue to observe pockets of defaults in either chronically or newly ailing
industrial sectors.  Appendix C lists the 1999 defaults by major industrial sector, as well
as the industry default data since 1970.  In 1999, in addition to general manufacturing and
miscellaneous industries (each with 14 defaulting issuers), such sectors as energy (12),
retailing (12), communications (10), healthcare (8), and leisure/entertainment (8), and
transportation (8-mainly shipping) lead the way.  The energy sector’s doldrums were
mainly early in the year, while retailing and textiles continue to be a chronic problem.
Industries such as communications and healthcare were new “leaders” in defaults,
reflecting the frenetic new issuance in the former and the overcapacity and governmental
regulatory fee related factors for the latter.  Hence, despite an ebullient economy, driven
by technology and productivity growth, a number of sectors have been ailing, and going
forward some will continue to do so.  Others, like energy and shipping, appear to have
experienced the peak of defaults.  As points of reference, Grossman and Verde concluded
that retail, insurance, supermarkets, drug stores, and textiles/furniture had the highest
default rates in the 1991-1998 period.
Appendix D lists the 1999 defaults by more precise industry classifications for the
individual defaulting issuers, and Appendix E an update on the recovery rates by sector.
Mortality Rates and Losses
Updated mortality rates and losses for 1971-1999 are reported in Figures 12-15.
Our total defaulted issue population that had a rating upon issuance and a price at default
now numbers 802 issues.  The methodology for these calculations comes from Altman
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(1989)6 and adjusts for calls, sinking funds, and other redemptions.  It is interesting to
note that bond calls in 1999 were extremely low ($5 billion overall and $2 billion in the
high yield market) as interest rates increased throughout the year and the end of year
promised yield to maturity on non-investment grade issues was 11.4%, compared to
10.0% one year earlier.  Treasury bond yields increased even more over the same period
(6.44% vs. 4.65%).  Similar to actuarial insurance experience calculations, our mortality
method measures default experience for major rating categories from the “birth” of the
issue and is market value (not issuer) weighted.  As such, it clearly adjusts for the aging
bias, and marginal default rate experience can be analyzed.
As noted earlier, 1999 defaults were distinctive in their higher than average
number and rate and also by their relatively early incidence.  Indeed, from Figure 9 we
observe that well over 50% (55% actually) of the defaults took place within two years of
issuance. The early default phenomenon manifests clearly in our mortality rate
compilations.  We observe that the first and second year marginal rates of default for the
period 1971-1999 are 1.58% and 3.92% respectively, compared with 1.14% and 3.00%
for the period 1971-1998 (see Waldman & Altman, 1999).7  The same trend is observed
in Figure 12 for BB defaults (0.71%, one year and 0.81%, two years vs. 0.36% and
0.73%, measured at one year earlier) and for BBB defaults, as well.  Interestingly, for the
CCC rating category, for which had an unusual amount of new issuance in 1998 ($9.3
billion – 2.6% of all new issuance – as shown in Figures 10 and 11), the first year’s
                                                 
6E. Altman, “Measuring Corporate Bond Mortality and Performance,” Journal of Finance, September 1989.
7R. Waldman and E. Altman, “Defaults and Returns on High Yield Bonds: Analysis Through 1998,”
Salomon Smith Barney Inc., January 1999.
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marginal mortality rate decreased slightly (from 2.03% through 1998 to 1.63% through
1999).
One reason, perhaps, for the marked increase in earlier defaults in 1999 was the
unusual amount of refinancing activity that took place in 1997 and 1998 as interest rates
dropped noticeably from year-end 1996 (see Figure 16 below).  Since refinancing does
not provide the issuer with new capital and liquidity, the usual aging effect will not be as
powerful.  That is, while we still observe in Figures 12-15 that the marginal rates increase
for the first three or four years after issuance and then level off or fall thereafter, this
phenomena is less dramatic with our most recent update.
We also note that although there is a marked increase in the first two years’
marginal and cumulative mortality rates and losses in this current report, the marginal
rates fell somewhat in years three and four in some rating categories.  Indeed, the five-
year cumulative mortality rates for BB and B rated bonds are only very slightly higher for
data through 1999 than they were one year ago.
The same observations can be made for our mortality loss compilations in Figures
13 and 15.  Again, the higher early mortality loss rates are a function primarily of earlier
defaults but are also caused by lower recovery rates.  Figures 14 and 15 demonstrate very
similar results for the more recent sample period 1983-1999, based on 679 defaulting
observations.  Despite the heavier new issuances in the last 15 years compared to the last
30 years, the mortality rates are virtually identical.
Returns and Return Spreads
Figures 16-19 document total returns and spreads on high yield bonds versus ten-
year U.S. Treasuries for the period 1978-1999, inclusive.   Fig re16 shows each year's
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absolute return and return spread as well as the promised yield to maturity and yield
spread at year-end.  The high yield bond market’s return spread ove  U.S. Treasuries was
a whopping 10.14% in 1999, bringing the arithmetic average annual spread for the last 22
years to 2.88%, versus 2.53% for data through 1998.  The compound average annual
spread, assuming reinvestment at the end of each year, is now 2.96% per year, versus
2.57% one year earlier.  Despite the relatively low aggregate return performance in 1999
for high yield bonds (1.73%), investors have now experienced almost a 3% per year
spread over default risk-free Treasuries for the entire modern history of high yield bond
investing.  Figures 17 and 18 show these absolute and relative returns and spreads for
various starting and ending years over the 1978-1999 period.  And, Figure 19 indicates
that a $1,000 investment in high yield bonds would have aggregated to over $11,000 by
1999, compared to slightly over $6,000 for ten-year Treasuries.
To reflect on this almost 3% return spread advantage, one must assess if this
result is sufficient to compensate for both the higher liquidity risk of high yield bonds
versus Treasuries and the fact that one might not achieve the average absolute return each
year (12.16%).  Although we only observe three instances over the last 22 years of
negative returns, it is clear that there is a possibility of unexpected losses, and investors
must be compensated for this risk.  Unexpected losses can occur in years of lackluster
performance or when a portfolio is not well diversified, and results fall short of average
market performance.  Publicly regulated and insured financial institutions typically are
required to allocate capital against these unexpected loss possibilities while prudence
guidelines for unregulated investors, such as mutual and pension funds, suggest
professional standards with respect to portfolio diversification and liquidity policies.
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Optimum portfolio analysis has recently become an important effort for the world’s
commercial banks in their trading and bank lending books8 but little work has been
published and tested for other credit asset portfolios, such as corporate bonds.  We expect
that greater emphasis will be put on formal portfolio models for bond investors in the
coming years.
Breakeven Analysis
From our prior analyses, we have shown that a relatively simple breakeven
analysis can be constructed that shows the breakeven yield (BEY) that investors must be
promised in order to compensate for actual or expected default rates and recovery rates.9
The end result is a comparison between actual yields at a point in time  and the breakeven
yield.  This shows the yield premium (if any), at any point in time (i.e., the amount to
compensate investors for risks, other than expected default risk, involved, e.g., liquidity,
unexpected losses, flights to quality, etc).
When we calculate Premium above the Breakeven Yield as of December 31,
1999, assuming a 3%, 4%, or 5% default rate and various recovery rates, the results are as
follows (a risk free rate = 6.44% and a high yield-to-maturity rate of 11.41% (Figure 16),
the results are:                        Recovery Rate_________
Default Rate 30% 40% 50%
       3% 2.43% 2.74% 3.05%
       4% 1.55% 1.96% 2.38%
       5% 0.65% 1.17% 1.79%
                                                 
8 See A. Saunders, Credit Risk Measurement, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1999.
9 This formula is as follows: 
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See E. Altman & J.
Bencivenga, “A Yield Premium Model for the High Yield Debt Market,” Salomon Brothers, March 15,
1995 and the Financial Analysts Journal, September/October 1995.
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We can observe that under all scenarios, the breakeven yield premium is positive
but, except for the 3% default rate and 50% recovery rate assumptions, in all of the
scenarios the premium is below the historical return spread (2.88%, as in Figure 16).  If
in the year 2000, we experience essentially the same default and recovery rates as 1999
(4.2% and about 30%), then the expected return spread will be about 1.55% --
considerably below the actual average return spread.  If, on the other hand, default rates
dip to about 3% and recovery rates are normal (40%) or above average (50%), then the
resulting premium is near or above the historic average.  As we will now demonstrate, a
reasonable default rate forecast for 2000 is slightly below 3% of a market size of about
$600-$650 billion.  This forecast makes no specific forecast about the nation’s economic
growth, interest rates, or stock market  levels.  If one or more of these important
exogenous factors collapses, default rates will probably increase from our forecasted
level.
Default Forecast for 2000-2002
Forecasting defaults is always a tricky exercise, but one that is necessary in order
to understand the dynamics of a risky security market, like high yield bonds.  One might
try to forecast micro and macro-economic variables, as well as the term structure of
default rates, or simply examine the historical experience that we can observe and
therefore feel more confident about.  We embrace the latter methodology in our attempt
to forecast default levels over the next three years (2000-2002).
We observe the amount of new issuance by initial S&P bond rating over the last
ten-years (Figure 10), extrapolate the average historical issuance for the years 2000 and
2001, and apply these amounts to the marginal mortality rate results from Figure 12.  The
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end result is a dollar amount of public bond, and domestic default forecast of $17.5
billion, $20.54 billion, and $21.86 billion for the next three years (Figure 20).  If we add
in expected defaults from the newly emerging European market ($0.752 billion),10 the
aggregate total for 2000 is slightly above $18.0 billion – a default rate of slightly below
3% on a $650 billion combined market – a reasonable expected size of the U.S. and
European markets for next year.  For domestic markets alone, the $17.5 billion results in
a 2.82% default rate for 2000, on a $620 billion base.
If we assume a 2.4 to 1 ratio of private debt (mainly bank and private pl cement
debt) to public debt (bonds), the anticipated amount of private debt defaults in 2000 is
about $42 billion and over $140 billion in the next three years.11  We will continue to
investigate the 2.4 to 1.0 private/public debt ratio as 1999 balance sheets become
available.  In terms of market values, Figure 21 assumes a 40% of face value price at
default for public debt and 70% for private debt.  The aggregate supply of new public
high yield bond defaults, measured in anticipated market values, is therefore $7 billion
for 2000 and $24 billion for the next three years combined.  Private debt defaults could
contribute an additional $100 billion.
                                                 
10 See D. Newman, T. Crawley and G. Peters, “Assessing Fair Value of European High Yield: Recovery or
WipeOut,” Salomon Smith Barney, London and New York, January 2000.  They predict 2.05% European
default rate in 2000.
11See our companion report E. Altman and P. M sset, “Market Size, Investment Performance and Expected
Supply of Defaulted Bonds and Bank Loans: 1987-1999,” January 2000.
FIGURE 1
HISTORICAL DEFAULT RATES - STRAIGHT BONDS ONLY 
EXCLUDING DEFAULTED ISSUES FROM PAR VALUE OUTSTANDING
1971 - 1999 ($ MILLIONS) 
PAR VALUE PAR VALUE DEFAULT
YEAR OUTSTANDING (a) DEFAULTS  RATES
1999 $567,400 $23,532 4.147%
1998 $465,500 $7,464 1.603%
1997 $335,400 $4,200 1.252%
1996 $271,000 $3,336 1.231%
1995 $240,000 $4,551 1.896%
1994  $235,000 $3,418 1.454%
1993 $206,907 $2,287 1.105%
1992 $163,000 $5,545 3.402%
1991 $183,600 $18,862 10.273%
1990 $181,000 $18,354 10.140%
1989 $189,258 $8,110 4.285%
1988 $148,187 $3,944 2.662%
1987 $129,557 $7,486 5.778%
1986 $90,243 $3,156 3.497%
1985 $58,088 $992 1.708%
1984 $40,939 $344 0.840%
1983 $27,492 $301 1.095%
1982 $18,109 $577 3.186%
1981 $17,115 $27 0.158%
1980 $14,935 $224 1.500%
1979 $10,356 $20 0.193%
1978 $8,946 $119 1.330%
1977 $8,157 $381 4.671%
1976 $7,735 $30 0.388%
1975 $7,471 $204 2.731%
1974 $10,894 $123 1.129%
1973 $7,824 $49 0.626%
1972 $6,928 $193 2.786%
1971 $6,602 $82 1.242% Standard
    Deviation
ARITHMETIC AVERAGE DEFAULT RATE 1971 TO 1999 2.631% 2.487%
1978 TO 1999 2.852% 2.705%
1985 TO 1999 3.629% 2.900%
WEIGHTED AVERAGE DEFAULT RATE  (b) 1971 TO 1999 3.224% 2.902%
 1978 TO 1999 3.244% 2.681%
 1985 TO 1999 3.327% 2.696%
MEDIAN ANNUAL DEFAULT RATE                1971 TO 1999 1.603%
Notes
(a)  As of mid-year.
(b)  Weighted by par value of amount outstanding for each year.
Source: Authors' Compilation and Salomon Smith Barney Estimates
FIGURE 2
HISTORICAL DEFAULT RATE, HIGH YIELD BOND MARKET  
(1971 - 1999)
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
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Source:  Figure 1
FIGURE 3
1999 DEFAULT LOSS RATE
BACKGROUND DATA
AVERAGE DEFAULT RATE 1999 4.147%
AVERAGE PRICE AT DEFAULT (a) 27.933%
AVERAGE LOSS OF PRINCIPAL 72.067%
AVERAGE COUPON PAYMENT 10.553%
DEFAULT LOSS COMPUTATION
DEFAULT RATE 4.147%
X  LOSS OF PRINCIPAL 72.067%
DEFAULT LOSS OF PRINCIPAL 2.989%
DEFAULT RATE 4.147%
X  LOSS OF 1/2 COUPON 5.277%
DEFAULT LOSS OF COUPON 0.219%
DEFAULT LOSS OF PRINCIPAL AND COUPON 3.208%
(a)  If default date price is not available, end-of-month price is used.
 
Source: Figure 1, authors' compilations, and various dealer price quotes.
FIGURE 4
DEFAULT RATES AND LOSSES (a)
 (1978 - 1999)
PAR VALUE PAR VALUE
OUTSTANDING (a) OF DEFAULT DEFAULT WEIGHTED PRICE   WEIGHTED DEFAULT
YEAR ($ MMs) ($ MMs) RATE (%) AFTER DEFAULT  COUPON (%) LOSS (%)
1999 $567,400 $23,532 4.15% $27.9 10.55% 3.21%
1998 $465,500 $7,464 1.60% $35.9 9.46% 1.10%
1997 $335,400 $4,200 1.25% $54.2 11.87% 0.65%
1996 $271,000 $3,336 1.23% $51.9 8.92% 1.10%
1995 $240,000 $4,551 1.90% $40.6 11.83% 1.24%
1994 $235,000 $3,418 1.45% $39.4 10.25% 0.96%
1993 $206,907 $2,287 1.11% $56.6 12.98% 0.56%
1992 $163,000 $5,545 3.40% $50.1 12.32% 1.91%
1991 $183,600 $18,862 10.27% $36.0 11.59% 7.16%
1990 $181,000 $18,354 10.14% $23.4 12.94% 8.42%
1989 $189,258 $8,110 4.29% $38.3 13.40% 2.93%
1988 $148,187 $3,944 2.66% $43.6 11.91% 1.66%
1987 $129,557 $7,486 5.78% $75.9 12.07% 1.74%
1986 $90,243 $3,156 3.50% $34.5 10.61% 2.48%
1985 $58,088 $992 1.71% $45.9 13.69% 1.04%
1984 $40,939 $344 0.84% $48.6 12.23% 0.48%
1983 $27,492 $301 1.09% $55.7 10.11% 0.54%
1982 $18,109 $577 3.19% $38.6 9.61% 2.11%
1981 $17,115 $27 0.16% $12.0 15.75% 0.15%
1980 $14,935 $224 1.50% $21.1 8.43% 1.25%
1979 $10,356 $20 0.19% $31.0 10.63% 0.14%
1978 $8,946 $119 1.33% $60.0 8.38% 0.59%
ARITHMETIC AVERAGE 1978-1999: 2.85% $41.9 11.34% 1.88%
WEIGHTED AVERAGE 1978-1999: 3.24% 2.24%
Notes
(a)  Excludes defaulted issues.
Source: Figures 1 and 3.
FIGURE 5
WEIGHTED AVERAGE RECOVERY RATES ON DEFAULTED DEBT
 BY SENIORITY PER $100 FACE AMOUNT (1978 - 1999)
Default Senior SecuredSenior UnsecuredSenior SubordinatedSubordinated Discount andAll Seniorities
Year Zero Coupon
No. $ No. $ No. $ No. $ No. $ No. $
1999 1 $28.06 1 $39.54 1 $22.86 2 $13.88 11 $6.26 16 $28.66
1998 6 $70.38 21 $39.57 6 $17.54 0 0 1 $17.00 34 $37.27
1997 4 $74.90 12 $70.94 6 $31.89 1 $60.00 2 $19.00 25 $53.89
1996 4 $59.08 4 $50.11 9 $48.99 4 $44.23 3 $11.99 24 $51.91
1995 5 $44.64 9 $50.50 17 $39.01 1 $20.00 1 $17.50 33 $41.77
1994 5 $48.66 8 $51.14 5 $19.81 3 $37.04 1 $5.00 22 $39.44
1993 2 $55.75 7 $33.38 10 $51.50 9 $28.38 4 $31.75 32 $38.83
1992 15 $59.85 8 $35.61 17 $58.20 22 $49.13 5 $19.82 67 $50.03
1991 4 $44.12 69 $55.84 37 $31.91 38 $24.30 9 $27.89 157 $40.67
1990 12 $32.18 31 $29.02 38 $25.01 24 $18.83 11 $15.63 116 $24.66
1989 9 $82.69 16 $53.70 21 $19.60 30 $23.95 76 $35.97
1988 13 $67.96 19 $41.99 10 $30.70 20 $35.27 62 $43.45
1987 4 $90.68 17 $72.02 6 $56.24 4 $35.25 31 $66.63
1986 8 $48.32 11 $37.72 7 $35.20 30 $33.39 56 $36.60
1985 2 $74.25 3 $34.81 7 $36.18 15 $41.45 27 $41.78
1984 4 $53.42 1 $50.50 2 $65.88 7 $44.68 14 $50.62
1983 1 $71.00 3 $67.72 4 $41.79 8 $55.17
1982 16 $39.31 4 $32.91 20 $38.03
1981 1 $72.00 1 $72.00
1980 2 $26.71 2 $16.63 4 $21.67
1979 1 $31.00 1 $31.00
1978 1 $60.00 1 $60.00
Total/Average 100 $59.07 259 $48.08 199 $34.40 221 $31.55 48 $17.32 827 $40.19
Median $59.47 $46.05 $33.56 $33.15 $17.25 $41.22
Source: Authors' compilation from various dealer quotes
Exhibit 6
AVERAGE PRICE AFTER DEFAULT BY ORIGINAL BOND RATING
(1971 - 1999)
Rating No. of Average Weighted Median Std. Minimum Maximum
Observations Price Average Price Dev. Price Price
Price
AAA 7 $68.34 $76.99 $71.88 $20.82 $32.00 $97.00
AA 20 $59.59 $76.52 $54.25 $24.59 $17.80 $99.88
A 65 $62.07 $51.86 $62.00 $24.86 $10.50 $100.00
BBB 98 $45.59 $43.41 $46.00 $23.79 $2.00 $103.00
BB 91 $40.11 $40.25 $37.00 $22.05 $1.00 $98.75
B 495 $36.82 $34.67 $33.00 $24.66 $0.50 $112.00
CCC 127 $38.19 $35.49 $31.00 $27.18 $1.00 $103.25
Total 903 $40.86 $38.43 $36.50 $25.76 $0.50 $112.00
Source: Authors' Compilation
Figure 7
RATING DISTRIBUTION OF DEFAULTED ISSUES (a)
AT VARIOUS POINTS PRIOR TO DEFAULT
(1971-1999)
ORIGINAL RATING  
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
AAA 5 0.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
   
AA 25 2.8% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
   
A 69 7.6% 12 1.4% 2 0.2%
   
BBB 96 10.6% 52 6.2% 45 5.6%
   
Total Investment Grade 195 21.6% 64 7.6% 47 5.8%
   
BB 101 11.2% 85 10.1% 76 9.4%
   
B 475 52.6% 450 53.3% 409 50.8%
   
CCC 128 14.2% 224 26.5% 225 28.0%
   
CC 4 0.4% 15 1.8% 41 5.1%
   
C 0 0.0% 7 0.8% 7 0.9%
   
Total Noninvestment Grade708 78.4% 781 92.4% 758 94.2%
TOTAL 903 100% 845 100% 805 100%
 (a)  Based on Standard & Poor's Bond Ratings  
 
Source: Authors' Compilation
RATING ONE YEAR
PRIOR TO DEFAULT
RATING ONE YEAR
 PRIOR TO DEFAULT
Figure 8
WEIGHTED AVERAGE PRICE AT DEFAULT
BY NUMBER OF YEARS AFTER ISSUANCE
(1971 - 1999)
Years To No. of Average Weighted Median Standard
Default Observations Price Avg. Price Price Deviation
1 62 $37.10 $38.85 $31.75 $24.45
2 135 $35.19 $32.02 $31.30 $22.30
3 144 $38.23 $35.59 $34.31 $25.83
4 136 $41.99 $41.90 $39.00 $24.90
5 112 $42.25 $40.65 $36.50 $27.30
6 88 $40.12 $53.38 $36.25 $26.33
7 52 $38.22 $41.66 $37.75 $24.16
8 35 $37.89 $36.42 $27.50 $27.07
9 19 $41.99 $50.22 $33.00 $27.34
10 27 $37.65 $41.29 $32.00 $22.78
All 810 $39.08 $37.81 $35.00 $25.15
Source: Authors' Compilation
Years to 
Default No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of No. of % of 
Issues Total Issues Total Issues Total Issues Total Issues Total Issues Total Issues Total Issues Total Issues Total Issues Total Issues Total
1 4 26% 3 3% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 20% 1 3% 2 8% 5 20% 2 6% 32 26%
2 12 30% 25 23% 18 13% 0 0% 1 5% 5 33% 9 28% 3 13% 4 16% 5 15% 37 30%
3 15 12% 23 21% 26 19% 7 13% 0 0% 5 33% 7 22% 3 13% 4 16% 10 30% 15 12%
4 13 11% 18 17% 29 21% 10 19% 2 9% 0 0% 3 9% 8 33% 9 36% 3 9% 14 11%
5 1 6% 23 21% 35 26% 8 15% 4 18% 0 0% 1 3% 1 4% 3 12% 10 30% 7 6%
6 7 6% 5 5% 10 7% 12 22% 6 27% 2 13% 2 6% 5 21% 0 0% 2 6% 8 6%
7 7 8% 5 5% 4 3% 5 9% 7 32% 0 0% 2 6% 0 0% 0 0% 1 3% 10 8%
8 2 2% 4 4% 10 7% 4 7% 0 0% 0 0% 2 6% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 2%
9 1 0% 1 1% 3 2% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 4 13% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
10 3 0% 1 1% 2 1% 8 15% 2 9% 0 0% 1 3% 2 8% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Total 125 100% 108 100% 137 100% 54 100% 22 100% 15 100% 32 100% 24 100% 25 100% 33 100% 125 100%
Source: Authors' Compilation
1989 1991 1992 19931990 1999
Figure 9
Distribution of Years to Default From Original Issuance Date
(1989 - 1999)
1994 1995 1996 1997
(By Year of Default)
1998
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
AAA $9,080 $24,135 $25,344 $25,257 $32,252 $23,606 $29,042 $3,471 $6,892 $35,173 $214,251
AA $23,010 $32,506 $40,270 $56,440 $34,154 $38,559 $53,206 $20,247 $30,345 $9,812 $338,548
A $31,138 $73,802 $89,096$124,883$102,833$127,499$159,112 $65,624$101,612 $23,614 $899,212
BBB $13,037 $22,541 $46,084 $60,068 $35,051 $43,669 $56,839 $57,659 $88,448 $35,640 $459,036
Total Investment Grade$76,264$152,985$200,794$266,649$204,290$233,333$298,198$147,001$227,296$104,239$1,911,047
BB $913 $7,148 $12,085 $15,786 $10,999 $12,402 $17,135 $29,321 $42,671 $28,000 $176,459
B $375 $2,183 $22,395 $28,694 $17,883 $11,026 $36,629 $73,361 $75,480 $61,500 $329,525
CCC $446 $316 $575 $1,176 $2,265 $1,023 $1,475 $4,036 $9,326 $3,400 $24,036
Total Non-Investment Grade$1,734 $9,646 $35,055 $45,656 $31,147 $24,451 $55,238$106,718$127,476 $92,900 $530,020
Total $77,998$162,631$235,849$312,304$235,437$257,784$353,436$253,719$354,772$197,139$2,441,067
Source: Securities Data Corporation and Salomon Smith Barney
Figure 10
Original Issuance of Corporate Bonds by S&P Rating
($ Millions)
(1990 - 1999)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
AAA 11.6% 14.8% 10.7% 8.1% 13.7% 9.2% 8.2% 1.4% 1.9% 17.8% 8.8%
AA 29.5% 20.0% 17.1% 18.1% 14.5% 15.0% 15.1% 8.0% 8.6% 5.0% 13.9%
A 39.9% 45.4% 37.8% 40.0% 43.7% 49.5% 45.0% 25.9% 28.6% 12.0% 36.8%
BBB 16.7% 13.9% 19.5% 19.2% 14.9% 16.9% 16.1% 22.7% 24.9% 18.1% 18.8%
Total Investment Grade97.8% 94.1% 85.1% 85.4% 86.8% 90.5% 84.4% 57.9% 64.1% 52.9% 78.3%
BB 1.2% 4.4% 5.1% 5.1% 4.7% 4.8% 4.8% 11.6% 12.0% 14.2% 7.2%
B 0.5% 1.3% 9.5% 9.2% 7.6% 4.3% 10.4% 28.9% 21.3% 31.2% 13.5%
CCC 0.6% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 1.0% 0.4% 0.4% 1.6% 2.6% 1.7% 1.0%
Total Non-Investment Grade2.2% 5.9% 14.9% 14.6% 13.2% 9.5% 15.6% 42.1% 35.9% 47.1% 21.7%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Securities Data Corporation and Salomon Smith Barney
Figure 11
Original Issuance of Corporate Bonds by Rating, Percentage of Issuance
(1990 - 1999)
Figure 12
MORTALITY RATES BY ORIGINAL RATING - ALL RATED CORPORATE BONDS*
(1971 - 1999)
Years after issuance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AAA Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
AA Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.36% 0.20% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.03%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.36% 0.56% 0.56% 0.56% 0.57% 0.57% 0.60% 0.62%
A Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.08% 0.04% 0.08% 0.05% 0.09% 0.07% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.11% 0.15% 0.23% 0.29% 0.38% 0.45% 0.45%
BBB Yearly 0.07% 0.25% 0.27% 0.53% 0.32% 0.32% 0.35% 0.06% 0.06% 0.24%
Cumulative 0.07% 0.32% 0.58% 1.12% 1.43% 1.75% 2.09% 2.15% 2.20% 2.44%
BB Yearly 0.71% 0.81% 2.65% 1.41% 2.35% 0.80% 1.71% 0.30% 1.45% 3.03%
Cumulative 0.71% 1.51% 4.12% 5.47% 7.69% 8.44% 10.00% 10.27% 11.58% 14.25%
B Yearly 1.58% 3.92% 4.88% 5.78% 4.62% 3.65% 2.38% 1.77% 1.54% 0.92%
Cumulative 1.58% 5.43% 10.05% 15.25% 19.17% 22.12% 23.98% 25.33% 26.48% 27.15%
CCC Yearly 1.63% 13.60% 15.16% 8.27% 3.05% 8.96% 4.02% 3.36% 0.00% 3.56%
Cumulative 1.63% 15.01% 27.89% 33.86% 36.07% 42.21% 44.53% 46.39% 46.39% 48.38%
* Rated by S & P at Issuance
Based on 802 issues
Source: Standard & Poor's (New York) and Authors' Compilation
Figure13
MORTALITY LOSSES BY ORIGINAL RATING - ALL RATED CORPORATE BONDS*
(1971 - 1999)
Years after issuance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AAA Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
AA Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 0.17% 0.18%
A Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.05% 0.03% 0.06% 0.02% 0.05% 0.04% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.06% 0.09% 0.15% 0.18% 0.23% 0.27% 0.27%
BBB Yearly 0.07% 0.15% 0.15% 0.28% 0.16% 0.20% 0.28% 0.04% 0.04% 0.17%
Cumulative 0.07% 0.22% 0.37% 0.65% 0.81% 1.00% 1.28% 1.32% 1.35% 1.52%
BB Yearly 0.40% 0.55% 1.99% 1.00% 1.22% 0.65% 1.05% 0.14% 0.81% 1.64%
Cumulative 0.40% 0.95% 2.92% 3.90% 5.07% 5.69% 6.68% 6.81% 7.56% 9.08%
B Yearly 1.07% 2.89% 3.89% 3.92% 3.33% 2.12% 1.45% 1.31% 0.82% 0.63%
Cumulative 1.07% 3.92% 7.66% 11.28% 14.23% 16.05% 17.27% 18.36% 19.02% 19.53%
CCC Yearly 0.96% 10.94% 10.61% 4.99% 1.97% 6.17% 3.59% 2.67% 0.00% 2.96%
Cumulative 0.96% 11.79% 21.15% 25.08% 26.56% 31.09% 33.57% 35.34% 35.34% 37.26%
* Rated by S & P at Issuance
Based on 681 issues
Source: Standard & Poor's (New York) and Authors' Compilation
MORTALITY RATES BY ORIGINAL RATING - ALL RATED CORPORATE BONDS*
(1983 - 1999)
Years after issuance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AAA Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
AA Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.44% 0.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.44% 0.67% 0.67% 0.67% 0.67% 0.67% 0.67% 0.67%
A Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.09% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.12% 0.17% 0.21% 0.24% 0.29% 0.34% 0.34%
BBB Yearly 0.08% 0.24% 0.26% 0.58% 0.30% 0.30% 0.33% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.08% 0.32% 0.58% 1.16% 1.46% 1.75% 2.08% 2.12% 2.12% 2.12%
BB Yearly 0.73% 0.83% 2.69% 1.32% 2.49% 0.66% 1.72% 0.33% 1.73% 0.84%
Cumulative 0.73% 1.55% 4.20% 5.46% 7.81% 8.41% 9.99% 10.29% 11.84% 12.58%
B Yearly 1.60% 3.96% 4.97% 5.69% 4.65% 3.35% 2.27% 1.11% 0.72% 0.52%
Cumulative 1.60% 5.50% 10.19% 15.30% 19.24% 21.95% 23.72% 24.56% 25.10% 25.49%
CCC Yearly 1.80% 13.60% 15.16% 8.27% 3.95% 12.83% 4.02% 4.80% 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulative 1.80% 15.15% 28.02% 33.97% 36.07% 42.21% 44.53% 46.39% 46.39% 48.38%
* Rated by S & P at Issuance
Based on 679 issues
Source: Standard & Poor's (New York) and Authors' Compilation
Figure 14
Figure 15
MORTALITY LOSSES BY ORIGINAL RATING - ALL RATED CORPORATE BONDS*
(1983 - 1999)
Years after issuance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AAA Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
AA Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.17% 0.17% 0.17% 0.17% 0.17% 0.17% 0.17%
A Yearly 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.06% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 0.03% 0.03% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.07% 0.11% 0.12% 0.14% 0.16% 0.19% 0.19%
BBB Yearly 0.07% 0.15% 0.14% 0.31% 0.15% 0.17% 0.26% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulative 0.07% 0.22% 0.36% 0.67% 0.82% 0.99% 1.25% 1.28% 1.28% 1.28%
BB Yearly 0.41% 0.56% 2.01% 0.97% 1.30% 0.55% 1.03% 0.16% 0.96% 0.69%
Cumulative 0.41% 0.97% 2.96% 3.91% 5.15% 5.67% 6.64% 6.79% 7.69% 8.32%
B Yearly 1.08% 2.92% 3.96% 3.85% 3.35% 1.95% 1.36% 0.90% 0.26% 0.30%
Cumulative 1.08% 3.97% 7.77% 11.31% 14.29% 15.96% 17.10% 17.85% 18.06% 18.31%
CCC Yearly 1.06% 10.94% 10.61% 4.98% 2.55% 8.82% 3.60% 4.56% 0.00% 0.00%
Cumulative 1.06% 11.88% 21.23% 25.15% 27.07% 33.50% 35.89% 38.81% 38.81% 38.81%
* Rated by S & P at Issuance
Based on 679 issues
Source: Standard & Poor's (New York) and Authors' Compilation
RETURN(%) PROMISED YIELD(%)*
YEAR HY TREAS SPREAD HY TREAS SPREAD
1999 1.73 (8.41) 10.14 11.41 6.44 4.97
1998 4.04 12.77 (8.73) 10.04 4.65 5.39
1997 14.27 11.16 3.11 9.20 5.75 3.45
1996 11.24 0.04 11.20 9.58 6.42 3.16
1995 22.40 23.58 (1.18) 9.76 5.58 4.18
1994 (2.55) (8.29) 5.74 11.50 7.83 3.67
1993 18.33 12.08 6.25 9.08 5.80 3.28
1992 18.29 6.50 11.79 10.44 6.69 3.75
1991 43.23 17.18 26.05 12.56 6.70 5.86
1990 (8.46) 6.88 (15.34) 18.57 8.07 10.50
1989 1.98 16.72 (14.74) 15.17 7.93 7.24
1988 15.25 6.34 8.91 13.70 9.15 4.55
1987 4.57 (2.67) 7.24 13.89 8.83 5.06
1986 16.50 24.08 (7.58) 12.67 7.21 5.46
1985 26.08 31.54 (5.46) 13.50 8.99 4.51
1984 8.50 14.82 (6.32) 14.97 11.87 3.10
1983 21.80 2.23 19.57 15.74 10.70 5.04
1982 32.45 42.08 (9.63) 17.84 13.86 3.98
1981 7.56 0.48 7.08 15.97 12.08 3.89
1980 (1.00) (2.96) 1.96 13.46 10.23 3.23
1979 3.69 (0.86) 4.55 12.07 9.13 2.94
1978 7.57 (1.11) 8.68 10.92 8.11 2.81
ARITHMETIC ANNUAL AVERAGE:
1978-1999 12.16 9.28 2.88 12.82 8.27 4.55
COMPOUND ANNUAL AVERAGE:
1978-1999 11.54 8.58 2.96
*  End of year yields.
Source: Salomon Smith Barney Inc.'s High Yield Market Index.
(1978 - 1999)
FIGURE 16
ANNUAL RETURNS, YIELDS AND SPREADS
ON TEN-YEAR TREASURY (TREAS)
AND HIGH YIELD (HY) BONDS
BASE TERMINAL PERIOD (DECEMBER 31)
PERIOD
(JAN 1) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1978 7.57 5.61 3.36 4.39 9.48 11.45 11.02 12.80 13.21 12.31 12.58 11.65 9.96 12.05 12.46 12.82 11.85 12.41 12.35 12.45 12.03 11.54
1979 3.69 1.32 3.36 9.97 12.24 11.61 13.57 13.93 12.85 13.09 12.03 10.16 12.41 12.82 13.18 12.12 12.70 12.62 12.71 12.26 11.73
1980 (1.00) 3.19 12.14 14.48 13.26 15.30 15.47 14.05 14.18 12.90 10.77 13.17 13.55 13.89 12.71 13.29 13.17 13.23 12.73 12.15
1981 7.56 19.36 20.17 17.14 18.87 18.47 16.38 16.24 14.56 12.02 14.55 14.86 15.12 13.76 14.32 14.12 14.13 13.54 12.89
1982 32.45 27.01 20.52 21.88 20.79 17.92 17.53 15.47 12.53 15.27 15.54 15.77 14.25 14.81 14.57 14.55 13.91 13.19
1983 21.80 14.96 18.55 18.04 15.21 15.22 13.23 10.26 13.51 13.98 14.37 12.85 13.56 13.39 13.45 12.84 12.15
1984 8.50 16.96 16.81 13.62 13.94 11.86 8.70 12.51 13.14 13.65 12.07 12.90 12.77 12.88 12.26 11.57
1985 26.08 21.20 15.38 15.35 12.54 8.73 13.10 13.73 14.24 12.43 13.31 13.13 13.22 12.54 11.78
1986 16.50 10.37 11.98 9.39 5.56 11.07 12.07 12.84 11.01 12.10 12.02 12.21 11.56 10.83
1987 4.57 9.78 7.12 2.99 10.01 11.35 12.32 10.35 11.62 11.59 11.83 11.16 10.40
1988 15.25 8.41 2.47 11.42 12.76 13.67 11.20 12.54 12.39 12.58 11.78 10.90
1989 1.98 (3.38) 10.17 12.14 13.35 10.53 12.16 12.04 12.29 11.43 10.51
1990 (8.46) 14.50 15.75 16.39 12.33 13.95 13.56 13.65 12.54 11.41
1991 43.23 30.16 26.09 18.23 19.05 17.71 17.21 15.48 13.86
1992 18.29 18.31 10.90 13.67 13.18 13.36 11.98 10.64
1993 18.33 7.38 12.17 11.94 12.40 10.96 9.59
1994 (2.55) 9.21 9.89 10.97 9.54 8.20
1995 22.40 16.69 15.88 12.80 10.49
1996 11.24 12.74 9.77 7.70
1997 14.27 9.04 6.54
1998 4.04 2.88
1999 1.73
Source: Salomon Smith Barney Composite Index; Edward I. Altman, New York University Salomon Center
    FIGURE 17
COMPOUND AVERAGE ANNUAL RETURNS OF HIGH YIELD BONDS (%)
1978-1999
BASE TERMINAL PERIOD (DECEMBER 31)
PERIOD
(JAN 1) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1978 8.68 6.60 5.01 5.51 3.17 5.82 4.13 3.10 1.99 2.57 3.15 1.64 0.19 1.77 2.43 2.66 2.88 2.68 3.15 3.14 2.57 2.96
1979 4.55 3.23 4.48 1.71 5.22 3.32 2.23 1.08 1.84 2.55 0.94 (0.57) 1.20 1.95 2.23 2.49 2.29 2.81 2.83 2.24 2.67
1980 1.96 4.45 0.67 5.39 3.05 1.79 0.51 1.46 2.30 0.54 (1.08) 0.88 1.73 2.04 2.34 2.14 2.70 2.72 2.10 2.56
1981 7.08 (0.13) 6.74 3.36 1.75 0.22 1.37 2.35 0.36 (1.43) 0.77 1.70 2.05 2.37 2.15 2.75 2.77 2.42 2.60
1982 (9.63) 6.49 1.93 0.18 (1.39) 0.29 1.59 (0.58) (2.46) 0.07 1.16 1.58 1.97 1.76 2.44 2.48 1.79 2.33
1983 19.57 6.62 2.97 0.39 1.94 3.13 0.49 (1.73) 0.96 2.05 2.42 2.75 2.48 3.14 3.13 2.37 2.90
1984 (6.32) (5.94) (6.48) (2.59) (0.22) (2.73) (4.75) (1.40) 0.08 0.68 1.23 1.04 1.87 1.96 1.23 1.86
1985 (5.46) (6.56) (1.30) 1.34 (2.00) (4.50) (0.69) 0.89 1.47 1.98 1.72 2.56 2.60 1.76 2.40
1986 (7.58) 0.48 3.28 (1.26) (4.32) 0.00 1.67 2.23 2.68 2.33 3.18 3.17 2.24 2.88
1987 7.24 8.05 0.61 (3.61) 1.38 3.08 3.51 3.84 3.34 4.16 4.06 2.98 3.61
1988 8.91 (2.99) (7.41) (0.24) 2.15 2.82 3.31 2.80 3.78 3.71 2.56 3.28
1989 (14.74) (15.07) (3.32) 0.44 1.58 2.38 1.93 3.14 3.14 1.93 2.77
1990 (15.34) 2.59 5.68 5.82 5.82 4.76 5.73 5.41 3.80 4.52
1991 26.05 18.45 14.26 11.80 9.40 9.72 8.78 6.51 6.98
1992 11.79 9.06 7.84 5.83 6.94 6.32 4.14 4.98
1993 6.25 6.00 3.87 5.76 5.25 2.89 4.05
1994 5.74 2.76 5.61 5.01 2.26 3.71
1995 (1.18) 5.50 4.69 1.22 3.23
1996 11.20 7.29 1.93 4.17
1997 3.11 (2.93) 1.83
1998 (8.73) 1.25
1999 10.14
Source:  Salomon Smith Barney Composite Index; Edward I. Altman, New York University Salomon Center
FIGURE 18
COMPOUND ANNUAL RETURN SPREADS BETWEEN
HIGH YIELD AND LT GOVERNMENT BONDS (%)
1978-1999
FIGURE 19
Cumulative Value of $1,000 Investment: 1978 - 1999
High Yield Bonds Vs. 10-Year U.S. T-Bonds
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Figure 20
Expected Supply of New Defaulted Debt: US Only 
(Face Value - Public and Private Markets: 2000 - 2002)
($ Billions)
2000 2001 2002 Total
Public Defaulted Debt $17.51 $20.54 $21.86 $59.90
Private Defaulted Debt* $42.02 $49.29 $52.46 $143.76
Total Defaulted Debt $59.52 $69.83 $74.31 $203.67
Estimates are based on marginal mortality rates, new corporate (Figure 9), actual
and expected new corporate bond issues by bond rating (average of last 5 years.
* Assumes Private/Public ratio of 2.4
Source: New Issues by Bond Rating Compilation from Salomon Smith Barney Inc.
and SDC Group
Figure 21
Expected Supply of New Defaulted Debt (U.S. Only, 2000-2002)
($ Billions)
Debt Type Defaulted Debt Defaulted Debt
Par Value Market Value*
Public Straight Debt $21.86 $8.74
Private Senior Debt** $52.46 $36.72
Total Defaulted Debt $74.31 $45.46
* Assumes market value at default 40% of face value for
Public debt and at 70% of face value for Private debt.
** Assumes a ratio of 2.4:1 of private to public debt.
Source: New Issues by Bond Rating Compilation from Salomon 
Smith Barney Inc. and SDC Group
Appendix E
WEIGHTED AVERAGE RECOVERY RATES BY INDUSTRY
(1971 - 1999)
Industry SampleWeighted Avg. Price Price Range Std.Dev.Median
Avg. Price Low High
Mining 50 $28.60 $31.88 $9.50 $99.00 $17.81 $32.00
Food & Kindred Products, Tobacco 25 $37.17 $43.49 $14.50 $88.50 $19.28 $43.75
Textile Mill, Apparel & Related Products 42 $35.83 $34.85 $5.00 $89.30 $18.21 $32.88
Lumber, Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures, Paper 13 $27.22 $32.50 $2.00 $75.00 $23.26 $43.50
     & Allied Products
Chemical, Petroleum & Energy, Rubber, Plastic & Leather Products 57 $57.93 $54.41 $12.00 $98.75 $27.27 $66.50
Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete, Metals & Fabricated Products 84 $28.72 $37.54 $2.00 $101.50 $23.02 $33.75
Machinery, Electrical, Electronic & Transportation Equipment, 60 $36.77 $51.39 $4.40 $86.00 $22.37 $41.25
     Instruments & Related Products
Miscellaneous & Diversified Manufacturing 29 $28.76 $37.25 $1.00 $94.13 $26.40 $30.50
Transportation (Rail Road, Bus, Air, Water, Freight), Pipiline 59 $39.05 $41.32 $5.00 $103.25 $28.44 $38.00
     & Transportation Services
Printing & Publishing, Communication, and Movie Production 77 $30.76 $35.45 $3.75 $97.00 $21.26 $32.00
Utilities 57 $61.56 $70.01 $17.75 $99.88 $19.78 $79.00
Wholesale & Retail Trade 144 $33.01 $35.47 $0.50 $98.50 $22.82 $36.00
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 120 $34.65 $35.29 $1.00 $103.00 $26.00 $31.40
Services 83 $38.25 $40.08 $2.00 $112.00 $28.30 $34.25
Total 927 $37.52 $40.36 $0.50 $112.00 $25.56 $35.88
Source: Appendices A and C and Exhibit 5
